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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity
SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG
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I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The men-
tal activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as
discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it
plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which
perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to)
peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent prop-
erties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
When we attempt to reduce complex operations to simpler and simpler ones, we find
in the end that discrimination or differential response is the fundamental operation.
Discrimination is prerequisite even to the operation of denoting or ‘pointing to’.
S. Stevens, 1939
What constitutes perceptual consciousness? The orthodox response is that per-
ceptual consciousness is constituted by the entities of which we are sensorily aware
when we are in a conscious perceptual state. There are two versions of this response.
One version is to argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by the external,
mind-independent particulars, such as the cats, carrots, or cups, to which we are
perceptually related in perception. Austere relationalists adopt this approach.1 A
second version of the orthodox response is to argue that an experiencing subject
stands in a sensory awareness relation to a peculiar entity and this peculiar entity
or the sensory awareness relation to it constitutes perceptual consciousness. This
peculiar entity has been understood in a multitude of ways. It has been understood
to be a strange particular, such as a sense data, a quale, or a Meinongian object. It
has been understood to be an abstract entity, such as a property, a property-cluster,
an (uninstantiated) universal, a phenomenal property, a proposition, or an inten-
tional object.2 As Dretske formulates the idea: “hallucinations are experiences in
which one is aware of properties. . . . Can we really be aware of (uninstantiated)
universals? Yes, we can, and, yes, we sometimes are” (1999: 162–3). Let us call such
views peculiar entity views. By ‘peculiar entity’ I mean any object that is not an
external, mind-independent particular.
While peculiar entity views analyze perceptual consciousness as constituted by
peculiar entities, austere relationalists analyze perceptual consciousness as consti-
tuted by the mind-independent particulars to which we are perceptually related
in perception. What the views have in common is that they analyze perceptual
consciousness as constituted by some entity, be it a mind-independent, external
particular or a peculiar entity. So the orthodoxy that perceptual consciousness is
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constituted by the entities of which we are sensorily aware is a commitment of
otherwise radically different views. Indeed, the idea is endorsed by views that dis-
agree on almost everything else. Austere relationalists, qualia theorists, sense-data
theorists, intentionalists, and most representationalists all endorse this orthodoxy.
There are deep problems with this orthodoxy.3 Therefore, I propose that we
make a fresh start in our thinking about perceptual consciousness. I will argue
that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. More specifically,
I will argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by employing perceptual
capacities, namely, discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical thesis, but I
hope to make it plausible. The thesis that perceptual consciousness is constituted
by a mental activity marks a profound break from the orthodoxy that perceptual
consciousness is to be analyzed as constituted by the entities of which we are senso-
rily aware. I will show how this new way of understanding perceptual consciousness
is more in tune with the empirical sciences than orthodox views of perceptual con-
sciousness. While the view I will develop generalizes to non-perceptual forms of
consciousness, I will, so as to keep the discussion tractable, focus on the case of
perceptual consciousness.
In Section 1, I will develop the view that perceptual consciousness is consti-
tuted by a mental activity. I call this view mental activism. In Section 2, I will
show that mental activism entails representationalism. Finally, in Section 3, I will
show that mental activism does not require that a subject must have a history of
employing perceptual capacities successfully in perception to employ a capacity in
hallucination or illusion.
Throughout, I will operate with the ideal case of a so-called perfect hallucination,
that is, a hallucination that has the same phenomenal character as a possible
perception. Similarly, I focus on illusions that have the same phenomenal character
as a possible perception. It is not relevant for my purposes whether a hallucination
or an illusion could in fact have the same phenomenal character as a perception. I
will assume for the sake of argument that such hallucinations and illusions exist and
will explain how to understand their phenomenal character given this assumption.
I focus on the case of such perfect hallucinations and illusions since they are
the hardest cases to explain. The analysis of the phenomenal character of perfect
hallucinations and illusions generalizes to an analysis of the phenomenal character
of hallucinations and illusions that the experiencing subject would not mistake for
a perception. So while I focus on the case of perfect hallucinations and illusions,
the view of perceptual consciousness I develop holds for all forms of perception,
illusion, and hallucination.
1. Mental Activism
Peculiar entity views are motivated by the fact that a hallucinating subject is not
perceptually related to what it seems to her she is related to. Since the hallucinating
subject is seemingly sensorily aware of something, she must stand in a sensory
awareness relation to something that accounts for the phenomenal character of
her hallucinatory state. Since she is not standing in a sensory awareness relation
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to the material, mind-independent particular that seems to her to be present, she
must be standing in a sensory awareness relation to something else. With the aim
of giving a common account of both perception and hallucination, most peculiar
entity views hold that a perceiving subject is related to the very same (or the very
same kind of) peculiar entity that she would be related to, were she hallucinating.
Thus, most peculiar entity views are common factor views. Moreover, with the
aim of analyzing perceptual consciousness in terms of a sensory awareness relation
to something other than the material, mind-independent particulars present in
perception, most common factor views analyze the common factor in terms of (a
sensory awareness relation to) a peculiar entity. So, most common factor views are
peculiar entity views.
I will develop a common factor view that does not amount to a peculiar entity
view and I will argue that this common factor grounds perceptual consciousness.
I avoid analyzing the common factor in terms of (a sensory awareness relation to)
a peculiar entity by showing that hallucinations exhibit a deficiency that can only
be explained with reference to accurate perceptions. So I propose that we do away
with the old debates and approach the problem of consciousness in a radically
different way. I will argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by engaging
in a mental activity, namely, the mental activity of employing perceptual capacities
in a sensory mode, that is, modes such as seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, or
tasting among others.4 We can call this view mental activism. Without further ado,
the argument for mental activism goes as follows:
The Argument for Mental Activism
I. If a subject S is perceptually related to particular α, then S is employing
perceptual capacities C by means of which she discriminates and singles out
α.
II. If S is employing perceptual capacities C by means of which she discriminates
and singles out α, then S’s phenomenal character is constituted by employing
perceptual capacities C by means of which she discriminates and singles out
α.
From I–II. If a subject S is perceptually related to particular α, then S’s phenom-
enal character is constituted by employing perceptual capacities C by
means of which she discriminates and singles out α.
III. If S suffers an illusion or a hallucination as of α, then S’s phenomenal
character is constituted by employing perceptual capacities C by means of
which she purports to discriminate and single out α.
IV. If S is perceptually related to α or suffers an illusion or a hallucination as
of α, then S’s phenomenal character is constituted by employing perceptual
capacities C, by means of which she (purports to) discriminates and singles
out α.
V. Employing perceptual capacities is a kind of mental activity.
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VI. If S is perceptually related to α or suffers an illusion or a hallucina-
tion as of α, then S’s phenomenal character is constituted by a mental
activity.
From I–VI. Phenomenal character is constituted by a mental activity.
In support of Premise 1, we can say that discriminating and singling out a particular
from its surround is a minimal condition on perceiving the particular. After all, it
is unclear what it would be to perceive a particular without at the very least
discriminating and singling it out from its surround. Say that I perceive a red apple
hanging from a tree. In perceiving the red apple, I will discriminate at least some of
its properties from its surround. I may discriminate its red color from the green of
the leaves around it. I may discriminate its round shape from the ovate shapes of the
leaves around it. Or I may discriminate the smooth and shiny surface of the apple
from the rougher, matte texture of the leaves. Such discriminatory activity allows
for scene segmentation, border and edge detection, and region extraction. If there
were no discriminatory activity, it is unclear how I could be perceptually aware of
the apple. If this is right, then perception is constitutively a matter of employing
perceptual capacities, that is, discriminatory, selective capacities.
Until the beginning of the 20th century, it was standard to analyze mental states in
terms of the capacities by means of which they were brought about (see among many
others Aristotle’s De Anima (1984) and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781)).
With the linguistic turn, this changed and it became standard to analyze mental
states in terms of their content. While the linguistic turn brought about much
progress with regard to clarity, giving up on analyzing mental states in terms of
capacities came at a cost. Analyzing mental states in terms of capacities allows for
a counterfactual analysis of the mind. But more importantly, we need not choose
between analyzing mental states in terms of capacities and analyzing them in terms
of their content. As I will argue in Section 2, insofar as perceptual capacities are
repeatable and yield mental states that are either accurate or inaccurate with regard
to the environment, employing perceptual capacities constitutes the representational
content of perceptual states. So we can hold on to all the benefits of analyzing
mental states in terms of capacities while reaping the benefits of analyzing them in
terms of representational content.5
What are perceptual capacities? A perceptual capacity is a mental capacity that
functions to differentiate, single out, and in some cases classify particulars of a spe-
cific type, such as instances of red (Julesz 1981, Krummenacher and Grubert 2010,
and To and Gilchrist 2011). Such perceptual capacities are determined by general,
functional relations between the organism and its environment—for instance, global
patterns of the organism’s response to its environment. If we possess the perceptual
capacity that functions to differentiate and single out instances of red, we are in a
position to differentiate instances of red from other colors in our environment and
to single out instances of red. More generally, to possess a discriminatory, selective
capacity is to be in a position to differentiate and single out particulars of the type
that the capacity functions to single out, were one related to such a particular. It
follows from the above that when we are perceptually related to a particular, we
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employ perceptual capacities by means of which we discriminate and single out the
particular (Premise I).
The relevant particulars are external and mind-independent objects, events,
property-instances, and instances of relations. The notion of property-instances
in play is best illustrated with an example: when one sees two qualitatively identical
white cups, the cups instantiate the same property, but the property-instances are
distinct. When one suffers a hallucination as of a white cup, it seems to one that
there is a white cup present, but since one is not perceptually related to the object
that seems to be present, one is not perceptually related to any instance of whiteness.
Consider Percy who perceives a white cup on a desk. He employs his capacity to
discriminate white from other colors and to single out white in his environment. He
may also employ his capacity to differentiate and single out cup-shapes from other
shapes in his environment. He may even employ his capacity to differentiate and
single out cups from, say, computers and lamps, or whatever other objects may be
in his environment. By employing such capacities, he is discriminating and singling
out actual particulars in his environment. Engaging in this discriminatory activity
allows him to detect the edge of the cup and segment the scene in front of him.
Percy can see the very same scene while employing perceptual capacities that
are more or less fine-grained. For example, he may initially not attend to the fact
that the rim of the cup is chipped, and so he may not employ his perceptual
capacity to discriminate the grayish color of the part that is chipped from the white
color of the unchipped parts. But then he might employ his more fine-grained
perceptual capacity to discriminate between the various shades of white and gray
on the cup. By employing perceptual capacities that are more fine-grained, the
phenomenal character of his perceptual state will be more fine-grained in turn,
and he will be sensorily aware of more details in his environment. So even if
everything in the environment remains exactly the same, the phenomenal character
of Percy’s perceptual state may differ insofar as he employs more or less fine-grained
perceptual capacities to single out the particulars in his environment.
As these examples illustrate, discrimination and perceptual consciousness are in
lockstep. Indeed, we can say that any change in perceptual consciousness is either
due to a change in the perceptual capacities employed or due to a change in the
sensory mode in which those perceptual capacities are employed. If this is right,
then any change in perceptual consciousness is due to a change in the mental
activity by means of which we relate to our environment in perception. More
precisely we can say that if a subject S’s environment sensorily seems to contain F
particulars (regardless of whether it in fact does), then S is in a phenomenal state
that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out
F particulars, where a phenomenal state is a perceptual state that is characterized
by a specific phenomenal character. So, phenomenal character is constituted by
employing perceptual capacities by means of which we discriminate and single out
the particulars to which we are perceptually related (Premise II).
How can we extend this analysis of perceptual consciousness to hallucinations
and illusions? To answer this question, let’s consider the fact that if we possess a
concept, then we can employ it even if we fail to refer. After all, if we say “That’s
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a horse,” pointing to where in fact there is no horse, we are arguably using the
very same concept HORSE that we would use if we were successfully pointing at a
horse. The failure occurs at the level of reference. There is no failure at the level of
employing the concept.
The very same thing can be said of perceptual capacities. If we possess a per-
ceptual capacity, then we can employ it even if we are not accurately perceiving.
Although perceptual capacities are determined by functional connections between
perceivers and their environment, arguably they can be employed even if one is
misperceiving, hallucinating, or suffering a hallucination. After all, the capaci-
ties are determined by general, functional relations between the organism and
its environment—for instance, global patterns of the organism’s response to its
environment—and not by individual token responses. One could be prompted to
employ such capacities due to nonstandard circumstances: Unusual brain stimula-
tions or misleading distal inputs. If this is right, then we can employ a discrimina-
tory, selective capacity even if a relevant particular is not present—where a relevant
particular is a token of the type that the capacity functions to single out. The
capacities employed account for the fact that in hallucinations we can purport to
single out particulars: From a first-person perspective it can seem as if we were
perceptually related to particulars in our environment.
If this is right, then we can say that when we hallucinate or suffer an illusion,
we employ the very same capacities that we would employ in a perception with
the same phenomenal character. Since in cases of illusion and hallucination, we
are not perceptually related to at least one of the particulars that we purport to
single out, we fail to single out at least one particular. We merely purport to single
out that particular. As a consequence, at least one of the perceptual capacities is
employed baselessly, in the sense that the target of discrimination and selection—
an external, mind-independent particular—is absent. Analogously, if we employ
a concept but fail to refer, the concept employed remains empty. If one employs
a perceptual capacity in an environment in which no particular that the capacity
functions to single out is present, then one fails to single out what the perceptual
capacity purports to single out. As in the case of concepts, the failure occurs at the
level of singling out a particular. There is no failure at the level of employing the
capacity (Premise III).
Consider Hallie who suffers a hallucination as of a white cup on a desk. Like
Percy, she employs the capacity to discriminate and single out white from other
colors and she employs the capacity to differentiate and single out cup-shapes
from, say, computer-shapes and lamp-shapes. Since she is hallucinating rather than
perceiving and so is not perceptually related to a particular white cup, she employs
these capacities baselessly. Yet even though she fails to single out any particular
white cup, she is in a phenomenal state that is as of a white cup, in virtue of
employing perceptual capacities that purport to single out a white cup. As in the case
of perception, employing these perceptual capacities constitutes her phenomenal
character. So what perception, hallucination, and illusion have in common is that
perceptual capacities are employed that constitute the phenomenal character of the
relevant experiential states.
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The difference between Hallie and Percy is simply that while Hallie fails to single
out what she purports to single out, Percy succeeds. There is no reason to think
that whether we succeed in singling out what our perceptual capacities function to
single out has any repercussions for the phenomenal character of our experiential
state. After all, there is no difference in phenomenal character if I employ percep-
tual capacity C to single out α or if I employ perceptual capacity C to single out
β, where α and β are qualitatively identical yet numerically distinct particulars. If
that is right, then we should not expect there to be a difference in phenomenal
character if I employ C to single out α or if I employ C while failing to single out
a particular. We can distinguish the employment of a capacity—what perceptions,
hallucinations, and illusions have in common—from discriminating and singling
out a particular—the matter on which perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions
differ. It is the employment of the capacity that constitutes perceptual conscious-
ness. Whether a particular is singled out does not affect perceptual consciousness.
Only if this is the case, can the view explain how a perception, a hallucination, and
an illusion could have the same phenomenal character and thus avoid a disjunc-
tivist view of phenomenal character. Since perceptual consciousness is constituted
by employing perceptual capacities, it is not revealed in perceptual consciousness
whether the capacities are employed baselessly and so whether we are perceiving,
hallucinating, or suffering an illusion (Premise IV). Furthermore, insofar as employ-
ing perceptual capacities is a kind of mental activity, this implies that phenomenal
character is constituted by a mental activity (Premises V and VI).
If it is right that two experiential states in which all the same perceptual ca-
pacities are employed in the same sensory mode have, ceteris paribus, the same
phenomenal character, then there is a metaphysically substantial common factor
between perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions. That common factor is consti-
tuted by the perceptual capacities that the subject employs in a sensory mode. As I
will show shortly, the fact that there is such a common factor neither implies that
we are aware of a common factor, nor does it imply that the good case is to be
analyzed as a conjunction of a common factor and some additional element, such
as a causal perceptual relation.
Before I show how mental activism amounts to a modestly externalist view
about perceptual consciousness, I will address two potential misconceptions. First,
we possess and make use of many discriminatory, selective capacities that are not
phenomenally relevant—even when we perceive. I have not argued that whenever we
use such a capacity, we are in a phenomenal state. I have argued only that phenom-
enal states should be understood as constituted by employing perceptual capacities
in a sensory mode. We can accept this thesis while acknowledging that there are
many capacities—including discriminatory, selective capacities—the employment of
which has no repercussions for our conscious mental lives.
Second, it is crucial that employing discriminatory, selective capacities is not just
a matter of differentiating particulars, but also of singling out particulars. Due to
this, the phenomenal character of perceiving an instance of red is distinct from the
phenomenal character of perceiving an instance of blue. Both cases may include
differentiating red and blue, but in the former case an instance of red is singled out,
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while in the latter case an instance of blue is singled out. So the capacities employed
are distinct and the phenomenal states differ.
1.1. Mental Activism and Modest Externalism about Perceptual Consciousness
So far I have shown how mental activism posits a common element between per-
ception, hallucination, and illusion at the level of employing perceptual capacities.
Now I will argue that at the level of the function of perceptual capacities, there is
a primacy of the employment of capacities in perception over their employment in
hallucination or illusion. In virtue of this primacy, mental activism is an externalist
view of perceptual consciousness. So I will argue that while at the level of employ-
ing perceptual capacities, perception, hallucination, and illusion are on a par, at the
level of the function of perceptual capacities there is a primacy of perception over
hallucination and illusion.
I have argued that perceptual consciousness is constituted by employing percep-
tual capacities in a sensory mode. These capacities are, however, in turn analyzed
in terms of the external, mind-independent particulars that they function to single
out. There is a primacy of the employment of perceptual capacities in perception
over their employment in hallucination or illusion insofar as perceptual capacities
are determined by relations between perceivers and the particulars they function to
single out. After all, the function of the capacity is to differentiate and single out,
say, instances of red in perception and in the case of a successful perception the
capacity does just that. Thus, perceptual consciousness is inherently related to the
particulars that perceptual capacities single out in the good case. So given the prop-
erties of perceptual capacities, perceptual consciousness is externally determined.
This approach allows us to recognize the austere relationalist insight that per-
ceptual consciousness can and should be explained in terms of perceptual relations
to the very external, mind-independent particulars of which a perceiver is aware.
Austere relationalists argue that perceptual consciousness should be understood in
terms of a sensory awareness or acquaintance relation to particulars in the per-
ceiver’s environment. This insight demystifies perceptual consciousness. However,
by arguing for the radical thesis that all there is to perceptual consciousness is to
be perceptually related to one’s environment, austere relationalists leave mysterious
how one could be in a phenomenal state if one is not perceiving, but rather suffering
an illusion or a hallucination.6
By recognizing that a minimal condition on perception is that the perceiving
subject discriminates particulars in her environment, we open the door to acknowl-
edging that perceiving particulars is a matter of employing perceptual capacities
that function to discriminate and single out particulars. By introducing such per-
ceptual capacities, we can reject the radical austere relationalist thesis. By rejecting
the radical austere relationalist thesis, the mental activism provides not just an
account of the phenomenal character of perception, but an account also of the
phenomenal character of hallucinations.
So, against austere relationalists, I have argued that perceptions and hallucina-
tions share a common element that constitutes their phenomenal character. How-
ever, with austere relationalists, I have argued that hallucinations exhibit a deficiency
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that can only be explained with reference to accurate perceptions. Hallucinations
are derivative of perceptions insofar as the perceptual capacities employed in hal-
lucinations can only be specified with reference to their possible role in perception.
I have argued that to possess a perceptual capacity is to be in a position to dis-
criminate and single out particulars that the capacity functions to single out in the
good case, that is, the case in which one is perceptually related to such a particular.
Since perceptual capacities are analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external,
mind-independent particulars, mental activism amounts to a naturalized view of
perceptual consciousness.7
1.2. Intensional Perceptual Consciousness and Extensional Sensory Awareness
While standard views analyze perceptual consciousness in terms of awareness rela-
tions to peculiar entities, mental activism acknowledges that a hallucinating subject
does not stand in a sensory awareness relation to anything despite being in a phe-
nomenal state that purports to be of mind-independent particulars. To defend the
conjunction of these two theses it will be helpful to uncover a key structural differ-
ence between perceptual consciousness and sensory awareness. For a subject to be
sensorily aware of a particular implies that the subject stands in a sensory aware-
ness relation to that very particular. So a subject cannot be sensorily aware of the
particular α without standing in a sensory awareness relation to α. Indeed, being
sensorily aware of α entails the existence of α. In this sense, sensory awareness is
factive. Peculiar entity views analyze perceptual consciousness in terms of that of
which we are sensorily aware. Such views take it that a hallucinating subject must
be sensorily aware of some entity, where that entity constitutes the phenomenal
character of the hallucination. Since she is not sensorily aware of any external,
mind-independent particular that she seems to be seeing, such views conclude that
she must be sensorily aware of a peculiar entity. Similarly, austere relationalists ana-
lyze perceptual consciousness in terms of sensory awareness relations to particulars.
The difference between the peculiar entity view and austere relationalism is simply
that the former has it that we are sensorily aware of peculiar entities, while the latter
has it that we are sensorily aware of external, mind-independent particulars.
If we recognize that perceptual consciousness need not be analyzed in terms of
that of which we are sensorily aware, we can circumvent any commitment to both
austere relationalism and the peculiar entity view. Consider a subject who is in a
phenomenal state, that is, an experiential state that is characterized by perceptual
consciousness. We can all agree that for a subject to be in a phenomenal perceptual
state is for her to be in an experiential state that purports to be of something. So
far there is no reason to say that she is sensorily aware of something. After all,
for a phenomenal state to purport to be of α does not imply that the subject is
aware of α (or of anything else). Being in a phenomenal state does not entail the
existence of that of which the mental state purports to be of. Moreover, being in
a phenomenal state does not entail the existence of some other entity to which
the subject stands in a sensory awareness relation. It follows that a subject can
be in a phenomenal state without standing in a sensory awareness relation to any
entity. So there is a structural difference between awareness of, on the one hand,
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and perceptual consciousness or being in a phenomenal state, on the other. While
awareness of is extensional, perceptual consciousness or being in a phenomenal
state is intensional.
Austere relationalist and peculiar entity views are structurally similar in that
they both analyze perceptual consciousness extensionally. By doing so both views
conflate perceptual consciousness with sensory awareness. Some views go as far as
to equate that which constitutes perceptual consciousness with that of which the
experiencing subject is sensorily aware.8 The idea that perceptual consciousness is
extensional goes back to at least Moore, who assumed that all sensory awareness
involves an object of awareness (Moore 1925: 54).
It is important to note that denying that a hallucinating subject stands in a
sensory awareness relation to an object (or some other particular) is not to deny the
linguistic fact that the expression “I hallucinate” takes a grammatical object. Even
so, there is no need to take this grammatical object to correspond to an ontological
existent of which the hallucinating subject is sensorily aware. The grammatical
object merely marks what the hallucinating subjects takes to be present and what
she would be sensorily aware of, were she perceiving an external, mind-independent
object.
This structural difference between sensory awareness and perceptual conscious-
ness is analogous to the distinction between relational and phenomenological par-
ticularity. A mental state is characterized by relational particularity if and only
if the experiencing subject is perceptually related to the particular perceived and
the perceived particular constitutes the mental state. A mental state exhibits phe-
nomenological particularity only if it seems to the subject as if there is a particular
present. Every experience that is subjectively indistinguishable from a perception
exhibits phenomenological particularity. After all, it is unclear what it would be to
have an experience that seems to be as of an external, mind-independent particu-
lar without it seeming to the subject that there is a particular present. Since the
hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to the mind-independent particular
that it seems to her is present, hallucinations are not characterized by relational
particularity. More generally, we can say that if a subject has an experience that is
intentionally directed at a particular, it will seem to her as if she is experiencing a
particular—regardless of whether there is in fact such a particular present. If this
is right, then any view on which a perception, illusion, or hallucination is inten-
tionally directed at the experiencer’s environment is committed to saying that such
experiences exhibit phenomenological particularity.
Now, one may wonder how such an account can secure the identity of halluci-
nated objects across hallucinations. It cannot, but this is a desirable consequence
of the view. A hallucinating subject may form false judgments on the basis of her
hallucinations and believe that the unicorn it seemed to her she saw yesterday is
the very same unicorn as the one that it seems to her she is seeing today. But the
identity postulated here is within the scope of how things seem to the subject and
thus based on mere phenomenological particularity. There is nothing in the world
that corresponds to how things seem to the hallucinating subject, and thus there
is nothing in the world that corresponds to this phenomenological particularity. In
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other words, the phenomenological particularity of her experience is not coupled
with any relational particularity. Since the subject is not sensorily aware of any
unicorn, no identity of the hallucinated objects can be secured.
1.3. Blurriness and Afterimages
The discussion so far has focused exclusively on perceptual consciousness (as) of
particulars that are either located in the environment of the perceiving subject, or
which merely seem to be so located, as in the case of an illusion or a hallucina-
tion. There are, however, aspects of perceptual consciousness, such as blurriness
and afterimages, that do not pertain to (seemingly) material, mind-independent
particulars.9 For example, upon removing a pair of prescription glasses, one experi-
ences blurriness. It will not, however, necessarily seem to one as if the environment
is blurry (though, of course, that can happen). Similarly, if one presses against
one’s closed eyes, one can experience color patches in one’s visual field—even after
reopening one’s eyes. As in the case of experiencing blurriness, it will not neces-
sarily seem to one that the color patches are colors instantiated in one’s material,
mind-independent environment (though, again, that may happen). How can mental
activism account for such aspects of perceptual consciousness that do not seem to
the experiencing subject to pertain to the material, mind-independent environment?
A blurry experience of a white cup can be analyzed in terms of employing the
perceptual capacity that functions to single out instances of blurriness (along with
employing the perceptual capacity that functions to single out instances of white
and the perceptual capacity that functions to single out the relevant shapes in one’s
environment, and so forth). The perceptual capacity that functions to single out
blurriness is grounded in perceptions of instances of blurriness: When I look out
of the window on a rainy day, the tree in front of my window is presented blurrily
to me because of the raindrops on the window. Now, seeing something as blurry
is of course distinct from seeing something blurrily, but the very same perceptual
capacity of blurriness can be understood to be employed in both experiences. The
difference between seeing something as blurry and seeing something blurrily can
be accounted for in virtue of what blurriness is attributed to. If one experiences an
object as blurry, blurriness is attributed to that object. If one experiences blurrily,
blurriness is attributed to one’s experience. In this way, mental activism undermines
the need to appeal to qualia, sensations, phenomenal properties, or any other
peculiar entities to account for aspects of perceptual consciousness that do not
pertain to particulars that are either located in the environment or that seem to be
located in the environment of the experiencing subject.
2. Mental Activism as a Version of Representationalism
So far, I have argued that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activ-
ity. Now I will show how this view is in fact a version of representationalism. Any
view on which perceptual consciousness is said to be grounded in representational
content needs to explain what it is about representational content such that it can
ground perceptual consciousness. Employing perceptual capacities just is to be in
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a perceptual state with content. After all, perceptual capacities are repeatable and
constitute a phenomenal state that either accurately or inaccurately accounts for
how the environment really is. Being repeatable and having accuracy conditions are
jointly key signatures of semantic content. I will give support to each claim in turn.
The very same perceptual capacity can be employed to single out particular α or
to single out particular β. As argued in the last section, if one singles out α rather
than β, one is in a distinct perceptual state, namely, a perceptual state that is consti-
tuted by α rather than β. This is the case even if α and β are qualitatively identical.
So the same perceptual capacity can be employed in distinct environments and yield
distinct perceptual states. If this is right, then there is a general, repeatable element
that is constitutive of perceptual states, namely, the perceptual capacities employed.
Moreover, the same perceptual capacity can be employed to single out α at time t1
and at time t2 and thus yield the same perceptual state at t1 and t2.10 In this sense,
employing repeatable perceptual capacities generates a perceptual state that is itself
repeatable. Being a repeatable capacity is of course not a sufficient condition for
yielding a semantic mental state. After all, many things in the world are constituted
by repeatable capacities without yielding semantic mental states. Being repeatable is
however arguably a necessary condition on yielding a semantic mental state. Now,
when one discriminates and singles out a particular from its surround, one may
do so more or less accurately or inaccurately, and the perceptual state reached will
be more or less accurate or inaccurate thereby.11 After all, a perceiver can single
out an object and correctly single out only very few of its properties; or she can
single out the same object and correctly single out many of its properties. The
first perceptual state will be less accurate with regard to the environment than the
second.12 So employing perceptual capacities yields perceptual states that exhibit
key signatures of semantic content: It yields something that is repeatable and that
can be accurate or inaccurate. If this is right, then employing perceptual capacities
constitutes a perceptual state with content.13 Insofar as employing perceptual ca-
pacities just is to be in a perceptual state with content, mental activism is a version
of representationalism.
So mental activism is both a view of perceptual consciousness and a specific
interpretation of the thesis that perceptual consciousness is grounded in repre-
sentational content. On most representationalist views, it is either left mysterious
how the representational content could in fact ground the perceptual consciousness
of the representational state, or perceptual consciousness is ultimately explained in
terms of awareness relations to peculiar entities. Recall, for example how Dretske
(1999)—the ultimate representationalist—argues that in hallucination we are aware
of universals. As I argued earlier, this view is deeply problematic insofar as it is
not clear what it would be to be sensorily aware of properties, given that properties
are not spatio-temporally extended, not spatio-temporally located, and not causally
efficacious. In contrast to such views, I am arguing that perceptual consciousness
is grounded in representational content in that representational content is yielded
by employing perceptual capacities which constitute perceptual consciousness.14
I have argued that both perceptual consciousness and perceptual content
are constituted by employing perceptual capacities. One might object that since
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perceptual consciousness and perceptual content are different in kind, they can-
not both be constituted by the same activity. In response, no doubt, perceptual
consciousness and perceptual content are different in kind. The latter, but not the
former, is propositionally structured. We can honor this even if we accept that both
are constituted by employing perceptual capacities. After all, perceptual content
is only partially constituted by employing perceptual capacities. It is constituted
also by the particulars singled out. Similarly, perceptual consciousness is consti-
tuted not only by the perceptual capacities employed but also by the sensory mode
in which those perceptual capacities are employed. But even if it were the case
that both perceptual content and perceptual consciousness were constituted exclu-
sively by employing perceptual capacities that would not be a problem. After all,
A and B can be different in kind, even if A and B are each constituted by ρ. For
example, bread and spaghetti are different in kind and both are constituted by
wheat. In short, there is no problem in endorsing the thesis that perceptual con-
sciousness and perceptual content are each constituted by employing perceptual
capacities.
3. Grounded and Ungrounded Perceptual Capacities
Now, how should we understand the relation between being perceptually related
to external, mind-independent particulars, such as white cups, and employing per-
ceptual capacities that merely purport—but ultimately fail—to single out any such
particulars? To address this question, it will be necessary to distinguish three pos-
sible ways of analyzing perceptual capacities.
On a first way of analyzing perceptual capacities, a perceptual capacity need not
in any way be grounded in perception. So on this version, hallucinations or illusions
as of particulars are possible even if no one has perceived the relevant particulars
(perhaps because the relevant particulars do not exist). We can call this version
ungrounded perceptual capacities. On this version, one can employ a perceptual
capacity in hallucination or illusion that has never been employed to successfully
discriminate and single out an external, mind-independent particular of the kind
that the capacity functions to single out.
On a second way of analyzing perceptual capacities, any perceptual capacity is
grounded in perceptions of the very perceiver employing the perceptual capacity
derivatively in hallucination or illusion. So it is necessary to have employed any
given perceptual capacity in perception to be in a position to employ that same
perceptual capacity derivatively in hallucination or illusion. We can call this version
radically grounded perceptual capacities. This version posits that the content of
hallucination or illusion is derivative of the content of perception insofar as it
ensues from reemploying and possibly recombining the perceptual capacities one
has employed in past perceptions. A view that is committed to radically grounded
perceptual capacities faces the problem that one can only have a hallucination or
an illusion as of a particular if one has perceived such a particular in the past.
On a third way of analyzing perceptual capacities, any perceptual capacity is
grounded in perception, but it is not necessary that perceptual capacity is grounded
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in perceptions of the very perceiver employing the perceptual capacity derivatively
in hallucination or illusion. The perceptual capacity can be grounded in perceptions
of some perceiver somewhere. So a perceiver can have hallucinations or illusions as
of particulars even if she has no past perceptions of the relevant particulars. While
the perceptual capacity is grounded in perception, it need not be grounded in past
perceptions of the very subject who is suffering a hallucination or an illusion as of
the particulars that the capacity functions to single out. We can call this version
modestly grounded perceptual capacities. This version allows that a subject could
have a hallucination or an illusion as of a particular unlike anything she has seen
before. However, some bridge must exist between my hallucination or illusion as
of a particular that I have never seen and someone else’s perception of a relevant
particular. Only if some such bridge exists can the perceptual capacity I employ
in hallucination or illusion be plausibly understood to be grounded in accurate
perceptions. The perceptual capacities employed in such hallucinations or illusions
could be acquired via testimony from a perceiver who has used the capacity in
perception.
We can reject radically grounded perceptual capacities. After all, the perceptual
capacities employed in hallucinations need not have been acquired through per-
ceptions. They might be innate, they might have been acquired through testimony,
or they might have been arrived at through imagination. Mental activism requires
only that that we must be in a position to use a perceptual capacity successfully
when perceptually related to a particular that the capacity functions to single out.
While it is possible to possess such a capacity without having been perceptually
related to any particulars of the type that the capacity singles out in the good
case, it is plausible that any such perceptual capacity is grounded in perception
insofar as the existence of the capacity depends on perceptions of the particulars
that the capacity singles out.15 If this is right, then it follows that there cannot
exist any such perceptual capacity that is not grounded in perception. It does not,
however, follow from this that an individual subject must have had perceptions
of the particulars that the capacity singles out to possess the relevant capacity. It
follows only that there can exist a perceptual capacity that functions to single out a
kind of particular only if a particular of that kind has been perceived by someone,
somewhere.
We can remain neutral here whether perceptual capacities are ungrounded or
modestly grounded. Mental activism is compatible with perceptual capacities be-
ing ungrounded or being modestly grounded. On both ungrounded and modestly
grounded perceptual capacities, a subject need not have had perceptions of par-
ticulars to have hallucinations or illusions as of such particulars. So both ways of
analyzing perceptual capacities posit that a brain in a vat could have hallucinations
as of white cups. If perceptual capacities are ungrounded, then an isolated brain in
a vat could have such hallucinations.
Can Jackson’s Mary hallucinate a red object?16 Mary is a color scientist who
knows everything about colors but who lives in a black and white world and
so has never seen any colors. So she could not have acquired the perceptual ca-
pacity to discriminate and single out red through perceptions of instances of red.
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According to mental activism it is not necessary to have perceived instances of red to
hallucinate a red object. So Mary could hallucinate a red object while in her black
and white world.17
4. Coda
I developed the view that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental ac-
tivity. According to mental activism, perceptual consciousness is constituted by
employing perceptual capacities, that is, low-level mental capacities that function
to discriminate and single out particulars in our environment. Mental activism is
a version of representationalism. After all, employing perceptual capacities consti-
tutes perceptual content. As a consequence, mental activism is a common factor
view: perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions with the same phenomenal char-
acter have a metaphysically, substantial common factor that is constituted by the
perceptual capacities employed. Thus mental activism avoids any commitment to
disjunctivism.
As I showed, there is no need to think that employing perceptual capacities en-
tails the existence of the particulars that the perceptual capacities purport to single
out. So mental activism allows that we can be in a mental state that is characterized
by perceptual consciousness without being sensorily aware of any external, mind-
independent particulars. A subject who is suffering a hallucination or an illusion as
of what seems to her to be a mind-independent particular α employs a perceptual
capacity that functions to single out mind-independent particulars under which α
falls. The perceptual capacity she employs is the very same perceptual capacity that
in a perception with the same phenomenal character is employed as a consequence
of the perceiving subject being related to the external, mind-independent particular
α or some such particular. Employing such a perceptual capacity accounts for the
fact that it seems to the subject that α is present and accounts for her being in-
tentionally directed at what seems to be an external, mind-independent particular
without in fact being sensorily aware of α or any other such particular. Thus, men-
tal activism avoids analyzing perceptual consciousness as constituted by (sensory
awareness relations to) peculiar entities—be they phenomenal properties, exter-
nal mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional
objects.
So mental activism reconciles the following three theses. First, the view does
not require positing that hallucinating or perceiving subjects stand in a sensory
awareness relation to peculiar entities. In this respect, the view is ontologically
more minimalist than any view that must appeal to such entities and thus upholds
Quinean commitments to ontological minimalism. Second, the view gives a pos-
itive account of the phenomenal character of hallucinations and, in this respect,
is an improvement over austere relationalism or austere relationalism. Finally, the
view analyzes perceptual consciousness, in terms of employing perceptual capaci-
ties, where perceptual capacities are in turn individuated by the mind-independent
particulars they function to single out. Thereby, mental activism amounts to a
naturalized view of perceptual consciousness.18
16 NOUˆS
Notes
1 For a defense of austere relationalism or naı¨ve realism, see Campbell 2002, Martin 2002, Brewer
2006, Genone 2014, and French 2014 among others. For recent critical discussions, see Schellenberg
2010, 2011a and Echeverri 2016.
2 For views according to which hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to
property-clusters, see Johnston 2004; for (uninstantiated) properties, see Dretske 1995, Byrne 2001, Tye
2002, Hill 2006, 2009, Pautz 2007, Siegel 2011, Mendelovici 2013, and Statzicker 2016; for phenomenal
properties, see Chalmers 2006, Block 2007; for propositions, see Russell 1913; for intentional objects, see
Harman 1990, Lycan 1996; for sense-data, see Robinson 1994; for qualia, see Levine 1983, Chalmers
1996, Block 2003, McLaughlin 2007; for Meinongian objects, see Parsons 1980. It is important to
note that one could argue that hallucinating subjects represent intentional objects without arguing
that perceivers stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to such objects. For a defense of such
a view, see Crane 1998. There are ways of understanding qualia on which they are simply identified
with phenomenal character, such that any phenomenological state necessarily instantiates qualia. This
understanding of qualia implies that experiences trivially instantiate qualia. But if that is all that is
meant with qualia, then introducing qualia just amounts to a reformulation of the fact that experiences
are phenomenal states. For a discussion of this set of issues, see Stoljar 2004. Block analyzes qualia
in terms of neural states. So for Block the final level of analysis is not qualia but rather neural states.
In that sense his view is more powerful than views on which the final level of analysis is qualia. It
should be noted that it has been argued that if inverted spectrum scenarios are empirically possible,
then introducing qualia is necessary, where qualia are understood as more substantive than simply what
can be identified with phenomenal character (Shoemaker 1982). However, as Egan (2006) has argued
convincingly, it can be ruled out on conceptual grounds that inverted spectrum scenarios are empirically
possible. Finally, one can argue that the content of a hallucination is a Russellian proposition without
arguing that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to these propositions
or their constituents. However, arguably, any view that aims to explain phenomenal character in virtue
of properties or objects that constitute perceptual content is committed to holding that the experiencing
subject stands in an awareness or acquaintance relation to these properties or objects. For a defense of
this thesis, see Crane 2006: 128ff. It would lead too far afield to discuss here to what extent such views
are peculiar entity views. I will reserve this for another occasion. For the purposes of this paper, any
view that denies that subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to peculiar entities is not my
target. I will address such views only to the extent that they face the same problems as peculiar entity
views. For a recent account of consciousness and an overview of the current debate, see Hill 2009.
3 See Schellenberg 2011b for a critical discussion of this orthodoxy.
4 Here and throughout, ‘constituted’ is understood in the sense of at least partially constituted. This
leaves open whether there might be other determinants. There are many sensory modes that are not
perceptual sensory modes. For example, kinesthesia is a sensory mode, but arguably not a perceptual
sensory mode. I am here focusing on those sensory modes that are relevant for perception, though
my argument would have to be adapted only slightly to generalize to phenomenal states that are not
perceptual states. For discussion of olfaction, see Batty 2010; for tactile experiences, see Fulkerson 2011;
for taste, see Smith 2007; for auditory experiences, see Nudds 2001, O’Callaghan 2010, Phillips 2012,
Wu and Cho 2013. See Macpherson 2011 for different ways of individuating the senses. See DeRoy et al.
2014 for a discussion of a multisensory conception of perception, and DeRoy 2014 and de Vignemont
2014 on multimodal unity and binding.
5 Analyzing mental states in terms of capacities has recently seen a revival. Sosa’s virtue epistemol-
ogy, for example, recognizes capacities (or competences) as the foundational level of explanation (2007,
2015). This paper contributes to that revival.
6 For a defense of this radical austere relationalist thesis, see Campbell 2002, Brewer 2006, and Fish
2009. Martin (2004) argues for a more moderate version of austere relationalism.
7 Externalism about perceptual consciousness is arguably the best approach to developing a natu-
ralized account of perceptual consciousness. However, see William (2004) for an argument that dualism,
which often goes hand in hand with phenomenal internalism, is not in conflict with a naturalistic
approach to the mind.
Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity 17
8 See, for example, Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996, Tye 2002, Brewer 2006, Fish 2009,
and Hill 2009.
9 Visual blur is often posed as a problem for the transparency thesis. For more discussion on blur,
see Smith (2008), Allen (2013), French (2014), Schroer (2002), and Speaks (2009, 2014). For other recent
challenges to the transparency thesis, see Kind (2003) and Howell (2016).
10 One could argue that different time-slices bring about a difference in perceptual states. If one
holds this, then the relevant perceptual state would be different, but it would be different only in this
respect.
11 One might object here that not all discriminatory capacities yield things that have accuracy
conditions. For example, thermometers discriminate temperatures, but we do not say that the state
thereby produced has accuracy conditions. In response, it is apt to say that the temperature indicated by
the thermometer either matches the temperature in the environment or fails to match the temperature in
the environment. In this sense, the state of the thermometer in which it indicates a particular temperature
has accuracy conditions. Thanks to Neil Mehta for pressing me on this point.
12 For a discussion of the relationship between singling out objects and singling out the properties
this object instantiates, see Pylyshyn and Storm 1988, Pylyshyn 2007, and Fodor 2008.
13 See Schellenberg 2011a, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 for a defense of this view.
14 Orlandi (2010) has argued that there is little empirical ground to suppose that sensory properties,
such as color, are represented in perceptual experience. If true, this would not present any challenge to
mental activism, whereas it would pose a prima facie challenge to views according to which in perception
a subject represents properties.
15 This is not implied by the argument of the chapter. The phenomenal evidence argument requires
only a weaker claim, namely, that any perceptual capacity is grounded in how things would come
out in the good cases. However, for empiricist reasons independent of the argument of this chapter,
it is plausible to assume that such capacities are grounded in actual perceptions and not just possible
perceptions. For a discussion of such reasons, see Goodman 1955.
16 See Jackson 1982, 1986.
17 For a discussion of experiences of novel colors, see Macpherson 2003.
18 I am indebted to audiences at Stanford University, University of California Santa Cruz, UNAM,
Mexico City, Rice University, the Bochum-Rutgers Workshop in New York City, the CUNY Cognitive
Science Group, Universita¨t Tu¨bingen, the Clark Lecture at Indiana University, Universitat de Barcelona,
University of Pittsburgh, the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy National Meeting on the Azores,
theMetaphysics of Mind Conference at Fordham University, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan.
I am grateful also to John Morrison and his graduate students for discussions in his graduate seminar
at Columbia as well as Nico Orlandi for discussions in her seminar at UCSC and detailed written
comments. Thanks are due also to Austin Baker, Ned Block, Laura Callahan, Rosa Cao, Megan
Feeney, Danny Forman, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Kevin Kimble, Kirk Ludwig, Alexander Morgan,
Krista Lawlor, Thomas Sattig, Miguel A´ngel Sebastia´n, Eli Shupe, Charles Siewert, Josefa Toribio, and
Hong Yu Wong, for helpful discussions.
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